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NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY, UNITED KINGDOM 
 	  In	   his	   satirical	   lexicon,	   The	   Devil’s	   Dictionary,	  Ambrose	   Bierce	   defines	   noise	   as	   ‘a	  stench	   in	   the	   ear’.1	   Noise,	   it	   is	   often	   thought,	   is	   something	   we	   do	   not	   want	   to	   be	  around;	   it	   is	   sound	   that	  we	   find	   unpleasant,	   or	   perhaps	   even	  unbearable.	   But	   just	  because	   noise	   is	   often	   felt	   to	   be	   negative,	   does	   that	   mean	   it	   is	   definitively	   so?	  Drawing	   from	   Michel	   Serres’	   notion	   of	   the	   parasite,	   this	   article	   provides	   a	   more	  nuanced	   explanation	   for	   noise	   that	   distinguishes	   itself	   from	   prevailing	   negative	  narratives,	  which	  seek	  to	  define	  noise	  as	  unwanted,	  undesirable	  or	  damaging	  sound.	  Such	  narratives	  have	   left	  noise	  vulnerable	   to	  moralising	  polemics,	  which	  construct	  silence	  and	  noise	  as	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  past	  and	  present,	  natural	  and	  cultural,	  relaxing	  and	  disturbing,	  and,	   fundamentally,	  good	  and	  bad.	  This	  article	   facilitates	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  noise’s	  ethical	  connotations	  by	  proposing	  the	  notion	  of	  noise	  as	  affect.	  Noise,	  according	   to	   this	   line	  of	   thinking,	   is	   to	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  a	  verb	  rather	  than	  a	  noun;	  instead	  of	  referring	  to	  a	  human	  judgement	  of	  sound,	  noise	  is	  recognised	  a	   process	   of	   interruption	   that	   induces	   a	   change.	   As	   affective	   force,	   noise	   has	   an	  existence	   independent	   from	   its	   particular	   manifestations,	   sonic	   or	   otherwise.	  Consequently,	  noise	  is	  no	  longer	  constituted	  by,	  or	  limited	  to,	  human	  perception;	  it	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allows	   space	   for	   those	   interruptions	   and	   interferences	   that	   impact	   upon	   entities	  other	   than	   the	   perceiving	   subject.	   Moreover,	   apropos	   Spinoza’s	   ethico-­‐affective	  understanding	  of	  the	  body,	  noise,	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  affect,	  no	   longer	  pertains	  to	  an	  overarching	  division	  between	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  nothing	  
inherently	   negative,	   bad	   or	   unwanted	   about	   noise	   (and,	   by	   extension,	   nothing	  
inherently	   positive,	   good	   or	   beneficial	   about	   silence);	   rather,	   these	   ethical	   (as	  opposed	   to	  moral)	   categorisations	  are	  relational	  and	  contingent.	  Thinking	  of	  noise	  in	  terms	  of	  affect	  provides	  a	  framework	  that	  allows	  for	  noise’s	  capacity	  to	  diminish	  and	  destroy,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   enhance	   and	   create.	   Finally,	  we	  will	   consider	   the	  use	  of	  noise	  as	  an	  artistic	  resource,	  which	  exemplifies	  what	  Henry	  Cowell	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘joys	  of	  noise’	  and	  the	  alternate	  aesthetic	  implications	  that	  an	  affective	  definition	  of	  noise	  may	  carry.	  	  
—THE RUPTURE THAT IS NOT A RUPTURE  Noise	   is	   most	   commonly	   understood	   as	   an	   audible	   problem,	   it	   is	   sound	   that	   is	  unwanted,	  undesirable,	  unpermitted.	   In	   the	  words	  of	  British	  physicist	  G.W.C.	  Kaye,	  noise	  is	  ‘sound	  out	  of	  place’.	  For	  Kaye,	  sound	  can	  become	  misplaced	  by	  its	  ‘excessive	  loudness,	   its	   composition,	   its	   persistency	   or	   frequency	   of	   occurrence	   (or	  alternatively,	   its	   intermittency),	   its	   unexpectedness,	   untimeliness,	   or	   unfamiliarity,	  its	   redundancy,	   inappropriateness,	   or	   unreasonableness,	   its	   suggestion	   of	  intimidation,	  arrogance,	  malice,	  or	   thoughtlessness’.2	  Noise	   is	  often	  experienced	  as	  destruction,	  disorder,	  dirt	  and	  pollution:	  it	  is	  thought	  to	  tarnish	  the	  soundscape	  with	  its	  presence.	  The	  French	  economist	  Jacques	  Attali	  notes	  that	  in	  all	  cultures,	  noise	  has	  been	   ‘associated	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  weapon,	   blasphemy,	   plague’.3	   Noise	   is	   often	  associated	  with	  contestations	  of	  domestic	  space,	  what	   ‘I’	  want	   to	  hear	   in	   ‘my	  own’	  home.	  It	   is	  responsible	  for	  sleepless	  nights	  and	  neighbourly	  disputes.	  The	  law	  tries	  to	  protect	  us	   from	  it,	  by	   trying	  to	  exercise	  some	  control	  over	   its	  presence:	  noise	   is	  that	  which	  is	  to	  be	  abated.4	  Noise	  tends	  to	  be	  synomynous	  with	  loudness;	  it	  is	  sound	  taken	  to	  the	  point	  that	  it	  is	  capable	  of	  causing	  us	  pain,	  of	  temporarily	  or	  permanently	  damaging	  our	  bodies.	  	  But	  what	  is	  noise	  before	   it	   is	  unwanted?	  In	  order	  to	  address	  this,	  the	  question	  must	  change	  from	  ‘what	  is	  noise’	  to	  ‘what	  does	  noise	  do?’	  What	  is	  it	  that	  noise	  does	  to	  become	  unwanted?	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At	  its	  most	  basic,	  noise	  interrupts.	  In	  communication	  theory,	  noise	  is	  defined	  as	  any	  interference	  in	  a	  channel	  that	  prevents	  the	  clear	  or	  correct	  communication	  of	  a	  message	  or	  signal	  between	  the	  positions	  of	  emitter,	  transmitter	  and	  receiver.	  As	  J.R.	  Pierce	   states,	   ‘in	   telephony	   and	   radio	   we	   hear	   the	   intended	   signal	   against	   a	  background	  of	  noise,	  which	  may	  be	   strong	  or	   faint	   and	  which	  may	  vary	   in	  quality	  from	   the	   crackling	   of	   static	   to	   a	   steady	   hiss’.5	   If	   we	   extend	   this	   communicative	  definition,	  emphasising	  the	  process	  by	  which	  noise	  is	  constituted,	  then	  noise	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  having	  an	  existence	  independent	  of	  or,	  rather,	  not	  limited	  to,	  particular	  sounds	   and	   sources.	   An	   interruption	   need	   not	   be	   loud	   or	   abrasive.	   To	   be	   sure,	   it	  need	  not	  be	  heard	  at	  all.	  By	  defining	  noise	  as	  an	  interruption	  within	  a	  system,	  noise	  can	  be	  sonic,	  but	  it	  may	  also	  be	  vibrational,	  visual	  or	  informational.	  It	  may	  take	  the	  form	  of	  the	  cricket	  chirping	  in	  the	  dead	  of	  night	  that	  prevents	  us	  from	  drifting	  into	  sleep,	   television	   signal	   interference	   or	   the	   deafening	   silence	   as	   the	   sound	   system	  fails	  due	  to	  a	  blown	  fuse.	  	  Nor	  do	  interruptions	  need	  to	  be	  sudden.	  Interruptions	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  an	  abrupt,	   unexpected	  blast	   but	   they	   can	   also	   take	   the	   form	  of	   the	  persistent	   hum	  of	  traffic	   that	   gradually	   inhibits	   a	   conversation.	   An	   interruption,	   however,	   requires	  something	   to	   interrupt:	   it	   requires	   something	   to	   act	   upon.	   The	   hum	   of	   the	   traffic	  becomes	   noise	   once	   it	   affects	   our	   activities,	   once	   it	   begins	   to	   interfere;	   when	   it	  enters	  into	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  system.	  That	  said,	  we	  may	  not	  know	  what	  it	  is	  that	  is	  interrupting.	  ‘What’s	  that	  noise?’	  might	  become	  an	  unanswerable	  question.	  Noise,	  as	   something	   that	   acts	   upon	   us,	   can	   be	   divorced	   from	  originating	   actors.	   So	   noise	  may	   come	   from	   the	   walls,	   or	   come	   from	   unknown	   spaces	   and	   directions.	   Noise	  strikes	   us	   as	   sourceless,	   coming	   from	   nowhere	   and	   everywhere.	   I	   may	   not	   know	  what	  it	  is	  or	  what	  caused	  it,	  or	  how	  it	  got	  here.	  It	  is	  ‘the	  thing	  that	  goes	  bump	  in	  the	  night’.	  	  Noise's	   role	   as	   an	   interruption	   within	   a	   system	   is	   a	   central	   theme	   of	   Michel	  Serres’	   The	   Parasite.	   Serres	   begins	   by	   telling	   a	   story	   of	   parasitic	   encounters.	   The	  country	   rat	   is	   invited	   to	  dine	  at	   the	  home	  of	   the	   city	   rat.	  The	   city	   rat	   feeds	  off	   the	  larder	  at	  the	  home	  of	  the	  tax	  farmer.	  The	  tax	  farmer	  has	  produced	  nothing:	  he	  is	  a	  parasite	  of	  the	  fat	  of	  the	  land,	  through	  law	  and	  power.	  However,	  the	  dinner	  of	  the	  rat	  parasites	  is	  interrupted	  by	  another	  parasite—noise:	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The	  two	  companions	  scurry	  off	  when	  they	  hear	  a	  noise	  at	  the	  door.	  It	  was	  only	   a	   noise,	   but	   it	   was	   also	   a	   message,	   a	   bit	   of	   information	   producing	  panic:	   an	   interruption	   a	   corruption,	   a	   rupture	   of	   information.	   Was	   the	  noise	  really	  a	  message?	  Wasn’t	  it,	  rather,	  static,	  a	  parasite?	  A	  parasite	  who	  has	   the	   last	  word,	  who	  produces	  disorder	   and	  who	  generates	   a	  different	  order.6	  In	   French,	   the	   word	   ‘parasite’	   has	   three	   distinct	   but	   related	   connotations.	   It	  may	  refer	  to	  the	  parasitic	  relation	  of	  one	  entity	  being	  hosted	  by	  another,	  such	  as	  a	  flea	  being	  hosted	  by	   a	   cat.	   The	  parasite	   feeds	   at	   the	   expense	  of	   the	  host	   but	   gives	  nothing	   in	   return.	   By	   extension,	   parasite	  may	   also	   be	   a	   derogative	   term	   for	   those	  branded	   as	   social	   scroungers—those	   who	   allegedly	   ‘feed	   off’	   the	   state	   but	  ‘contribute’	   nothing	   in	   return.	   The	   third	   parasite	   is	   the	   informational	   parasite,	   it	  refers	   to	   static	   or	   noise	   interference	  within	   a	   channel.	   These	   three	   parasites—the	  biological,	   the	   social	   and	   the	   informational—are	   all	   thought	   of	   as	   interferences	  within	  a	  system;	  they	  interrupt	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  set	  of	  relations.	  The	  parasite	  appears	  in	   the	   midst	   of	   things;	   Serres	   states	   that	   ‘the	   position	   of	   the	   parasite	   is	   to	   be	  between’.7	  However,	  in	  Serres’	  thesis	  the	  parasite	  is	  not	  a	  substantial	  entity;	  rather	  it	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  type	  of	  relation.	  Host,	  guest	  and	  parasite,	  or,	  sender,	  receiver	  and	  noise	  ‘are	  positions	  through	  which	  any	  entity—informational,	  social	  or	  biological—must	   pass’.8	   Subsequently,	   the	   relationship	   between	   hosts	   and	   parasites	   is	   not	  always	  clear:	  who	  parasites	  who?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  rat’s	  feast:	  the	  parasites	  parasite	  the	   parasite,	   until	   they	   are	   acted	   upon	   by	   another	   parasite.	   This	   final	   parasite	   is	  thought	   to	   be	   the	   noise	   of	   the	   tax	   farmer-­‐parasite—the	   return	   of	   the	   parasited-­‐parasite.	  	  For	  Serres,	  the	  noise-­‐parasite	  is	  inevitable:	  ‘there	  are	  channels	  so	  there	  must	  be	  noise’.9	  A	  vulnerability	  to	  interruption	  is	  necessary,	  as	  Steven	  Connor	  states:	  	  Without	   the	   sensitivity	   and	   responsiveness	   of	   the	  wire,	  which	   renders	   it	  apt	  to	  act	  as	  a	  carrier	  of	  the	  voice	  or	  the	  word,	  there	  could	  be	  no	  passage	  or	  message	   at	   all.	   Its	   risk,	   its	   exposure	   to	   interference,	   is	   what	   makes	   it	  work.10	  To	  twist	  this	  a	  little:	  perhaps	  we	  can	  say	  that	  it	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  there	  is	  always	  noise	  that	  is	  perceivable,	  but	  rather,	  there	  is	  always	  the	  potential	  for	  noise	  within	  a	  system;	  there	  is	  always	  the	  potential	   for	  change.	  As	  such,	  there	  is,	  perhaps,	  a	  noise	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before	   the	   noise;	   it	   is	   white	   noise,	   absolute	   noise,	   noise	   without	   a	   signal.	   This	  underlying	   potentiality,	   the	   noise	   before	   the	   noise,	   which	   flows	   through	   channels	  and	   systems,	   through	  orders	   of	   relations,	  means	   that	   there	   is	   always	  noise;	   it	   just	  may	  not	  be	  actualised,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  perceivable	  or	  it	  may	  exist	  with	  little	  intensity.	  And	   so	   the	   rupture	   is	   not	   a	   rupture;	   rather,	   it	   is	   a	  move	   from	   the	   infra-­‐empirical	  towards	  the	  empirical,	  from	  (virtual)	  potentiality	  to	  actuality.	  Within	   this	   system	   of	   fluid,	   parasitic	   relations,	   noise	   can	   become	   contagious,	  passing	  between	  objects	  and	  subjects.	   I	  may	  scream	  with	  fright	  as	  I	  am	  startled	  by	  the	   unexpected	   sound	   of	   a	   pan	   being	   dropped	   in	   the	   kitchen.	   My	   scream	   in	   turn	  startles	   my	   housemate	   who	   has	   dropped	   the	   pan,	   and	   also	   my	   cat,	   who	   was	  previously	  unaffected	  by	  the	  first	  noise.	  Noise	  spreads	  through	  the	  house,	  in	  various	  directions.	   A	   similar	   relation	   is	   at	   stake	   for	   neighbours	   engaged	   in	   ‘volume	  wars’.	  One	   household	   may	   switch	   on	   music	   to	   drown	   out	   the	   noise	   of	   a	   car	   alarm.	   The	  music	  may	   then	  disturb	  another	  household,	  whose	  response	   is	   to	   turn	   their	  music	  up,	  loudly,	  to	  drown	  out	  the	  noise	  of	  their	  neighbours.	  The	  first	  household,	  riled	  by	  this	   response,	   up	   their	   volume,	   further	   antagonising	   their	   neighbours.	   Other	  households	  begin	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  noise;	  television	  sets	  are	  turned	  up,	  walls	  are	  banged	   and,	   eventually,	   police	   are	   called.	   Their	   sirens	   work	   to	   disturb	   an	   entire	  neighbourhood.	  Here,	   the	   effects	   of	   noise	   becomes	   an	   interruption	  within	   another	  system	  of	  relations:	  the	  first	  household	  turns	  up	  the	  music	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  car	  alarm,	  only	  for	  their	  music	  to	  act	  as	  noise	  for	  their	  neighbour.	  Likewise,	  the	  audible	  glitches,	  static	  and	  crackles	  that	  interrupt	  the	  radio	  broadcast	  we	  are	  listening	  to	  are	  the	  effect	  of	  signal	  noise;	  the	  audible	  noise	  that	  we	  perceive,	  that	  interferes	  with	  the	  broadcast,	   is	   the	  result,	  or	   the	   translation,	  of	  an	   inaudible	  and	   imperceptible	  noise	  within	  another	  system	  of	  relations.	  	  When	   noise	   interrupts,	   it	   demands	   a	   reaction;	   it	   induces	   a	   change,	   or	  modification	  in	  the	  system	  that	  it	  acts	  upon.	  Serres’	  parasitic	  interference	  functions	  to	   alter	   a	   set	   of	   relations	   or	   patterns	   of	  movement.	   Serres	   identifies	   two	   primary	  responses	   to	   the	   parasite’s	   intrusion—the	   host	   may	   cast	   out	   the	   parasite,	   or,	  alternatively,	  the	  host	  may	  adapt	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  the	  parasite’s	  presence.	  It	  is	   not	   in	   the	   parasite’s	   interests	   to	   destroy	   its	   host;	   rather,	   the	   parasite	   strives	   to	  create	  a	  new,	  sustainable	  equilibrium,	  in	  which	  both	  parasite	  and	  host	  can	  prosper.	  The	   optimum	   relationship	   between	   parasite	   and	   host	   produces	   a	   change	   that	   is	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mutually	   sustainable,	   since	   to	   destroy	   the	   host	   would	   ultimately	   destroy	   the	  parasite.	   The	   same	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   noise.	   When	   noise	   acts	   upon	   a	   system	   of	  relations,	  it	  may	  be	  met	  with	  attempts	  to	  cease	  or	  abate	  its	  presence,	  or	  the	  system	  may	   adapt	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   interruption;	   it	   may	   work	   around,	   or	   work	   with	   the	  interference.	  Similarly,	  the	  noise-­‐parasite	  may	  become	  embedded,	  it	  may	  ‘stick’	  to	  its	  host.	  Although	  its	  entrance	  into	  the	  system	  may	  be	  unintentional	  or	  unexpected,	  the	  embedded	  parasite	  is	  not	  necessarily	  extraneous,	  or	  a	  cause	  of	  trouble;	  it	  may	  work	  to	  provide	  new	  information,	  or	  generate	  new	  effects.	  As	  Steven	  Crocker	  states:	  	  When	  we	  hear	  the	  earliest	  sound	  recordings	  of	  Tennyson	  reading	  Charge	  
of	   the	   Light	   Brigade,	   for	   example,	   the	   watered	   down	   and	   scratched	   out	  sound	   conveys	   the	   enormous	  passage	   of	   time,	   just	   as	   the	   static	   sound	  of	  Neil	  Armstrong’s	  voice	  on	  the	  moon	  tells	  us	  something	  about	  his	  physical	  distance	   from	  us	   and	   the	   newness	   of	   space	   technologies	   in	   the	   1960s.	   It	  would	   not	   be	   difficult	   to	   think	   of	   countless	   other	   cases	   in	   which	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  medium	  mixes	   in	  with	   the	   intended	  message	   to	  produce	  some	   whole	   new	   effect,	   not	   intended	   by	   the	   sender,	   but	   taken	   as	  information	   by	   the	   receiver.	   In	   these	   cases,	   noise	   is	   not	   simply	   an	   extra	  third	  thing	  to	  be	  discounted.	  It	  has	  entered	  into	  the	  message	  and	  become	  part	  of	  it.11	  Thus	  while	  the	  noise-­‐parasite	  may	  work	  to	  unsettle	  or	  destabilise,	  it	  does	  not	  simply	  
destroy	   a	   system	   of	   relations.	   Rather,	   the	   noise-­‐parasite	   induces	   a	   modification	  within	   the	  system.	   In	   turn,	  noise	  can	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  productive,	   insomuch	  that	   it	  generates	  a	  systemic	  change;	  for	  better	  or	  for	  worse,	  an	  alternative	  order	  is	  created	  out	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  disorder.	  	  If	   noise	   is	   an	   interrupting	   force	   that	  modifies	   a	   system	   of	   relations,	   then	   the	  question	  is	  not	  just	  ‘what	  kind’	  of	  noise	  but	  also	  ‘how	  much’	  noise.	  Noise’s	  extensive,	  qualitative	  variability	   is	  accompanied	  and	  shaped	  by	  noise’s	   intensive,	  quantitative	  variability:	   the	   difference	   between	   a	   glitch	   and	   a	   system	   crash,	   between	   the	  background	  hum	  and	   the	  overwhelming	   roar	  of	   the	   city,	  between	   ‘the	   crackling	  of	  static	  to	  a	  steady	  hiss’—is	  not	  just	  one	  of	  quality	  but	  also	  quantity:	  How	  much	  noise?	  How	  much	  interruption?	  How	  much	  modification?	  How	  much	  change?	  And	  if	  noise’s	  interruptions	   have	   a	   quantitative	   and	   qualitative	   variability	   then	   so	   too	   do	   the	  reactions	   it	   induces.	   For	   example,	   the	   noise	   of	   the	   traffic	   that	   inhibits	   my	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conversation	  may	  cause	  me	  to	  increase	  the	  volume	  of	  my	  voice,	  or	  use	  more	  physical	  gestures,	  to	  convey	  my	  message.	  I	  may	  not	  even	  be	  aware	  that	  I	  am	  raising	  my	  voice	  or	  that	  I	  have	  increased	  my	  gesturing	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  the	  interference,	  and	  I	   may	   not	   consciously	   register	   the	   traffic’s	   increasing	   volume.	   Alternatively,	   the	  interruption	   may	   be	   so	   severe	   it	   requires	   me	   to	   abandon	   the	   space	   and	   relocate	  elsewhere.	  	  The	   change	   of	   relations	   that	   noise	   generates	   does	   not	   have	   to	   be	   overtly	  physical.	  Noise	  can	  also	  interrupt	  feeling;	  it	  can	  induce	  a	  modulation	  or	  modification	  in	  mood	  or	   temperament.	   The	   capacity	   of	   noise	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   upon	   feeling	   is	  present	   in	   the	   word’s	   etymology:	   noise	   is	   thought	   to	   relate	   to	   the	   Latin	   nausea,	  literally	  meaning	  ‘seasickness’.	  It	  is	  often	  said,	  for	  example,	  that	  ‘noise	  annoys’;	  it	  can	  provoke	  feelings	  of	  frustration	  or	  gradually	  become	  a	  source	  of	  irritation.	  Noise	  can	  generate	  fear;	  it	  may	  startle	  us,	  or	  jolt	  us	  into	  a	  state	  of	  alertness.	  There	  have	  been	  various	   studies	   that	   have	   linked	   noise	   to	   a	   range	   of	   adverse,	   non-­‐auditory	  physiological	   and	   psychological	   effects,	   including	   increased	   blood	   pressure	   and	  stress	  levels.12	  But	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  body’s	  response	  is	  also	  dependent	  on	  the	  state	  of	  relations	   before	   noise’s	   interference.	   The	   capacity	   of	   the	   noise	   coming	   from	   my	  neighbours	  to	  make	  me	  feel	  irritated	  depends	  on	  whether	  I	  already	  feel	  stressed	  or	  irritable.	   If	   I	   feel	   calm,	   I	  may	  be	  more	   tolerant	   of	   the	  neighbours’	   sonic	   intrusions	  and,	   consequently,	   will	   find	   it	   easier	   to	   accommodate	   them	   in	   ‘my’	   environment.	  Thus	   while	   noise	   is	   generative	   of	   change,	   the	   outcome,	   or	   the	   response	   to	   that	  change	  is	  variable.	  	  
—THE NOISE AFFECT  What	  is	  being	  implied	  here	  is	  that	  noise,	  understood	  as	  an	  interruption	  that	  induces	  a	  modification	   in	   bodies,	   systems	   and	   relations,	   has	   an	   intimate	   relationship	  with	  what	  we	  might	   call	   affect.	   Affects,	   as	   they	   are	   figured	   in	   the	  work	   of	   Deleuze	   and	  Guattari,	  and,	   following	  on	  from	  them,	  Brian	  Massumi,	  concern	  movement,	  process	  and	   change;	   they	   are	   forces	   of	   becoming.13	   Affects	   have	   no	   meaning	   in	   and	   of	  themselves.	   They	   may	   travel	   through	   signs	   and	   representations,	   but	   they	   exist	  independently	  of,	  and	  function	  according	  to	  a	  different	  logic	  to,	  that	  of	  the	  symbolic	  register.	  Affects	  do	  not	  have	  a	  pure,	  original	  state;	  there	  is	  not	  a	  moment	  of	  birth,	  so	  to	  speak.	  Rather,	  ‘affect	  arises	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  in-­between-­ness:	  in	  the	  capacities	  to	  act	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and	   be	   acted	   upon’.14	   Like	   noise,	   affect	   exists	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   things.	   It	   can	   be	  thought	   of	   as	   the	   transitional	   moment	   of	   confusion	   or	   indiscernibility	   between	  determinable	  states—between	  one	  set	  of	  relations	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  set	  of	  relations.	  While	   the	   terms	   are	   often	   used	   interchangeably,	   affects	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	  related	   to	   but	   distinct	   from	   emotions.15	   Emotion	   exists	   as	   a	   point	   of	   capture;	   the	  point	  at	  which	  affects	  are	  pinned	  down	  and	  qualified	   in	   consciousness.	  Emotion	   is	  that	  which	  is	  induced	  by,	  or	  a	  particular	  expression	  of,	  affect.	  I	  can	  ‘have’	  or	  ‘possess’	  my	   own	   emotions,	   but	   affects,	   by	   contrast,	   traverse	   or	   overwhelm	   me:	   they	   are	  beyond	   my	   control.	   In	   other	   words:	   ‘where	   emotion	   suggests	   something	   that	  happens	   inside	   and	   tends	   toward	   outward	   expression,	   affect	   indicates	   something	  relational	   and	   transformative.	   One	   has	   emotions;	   one	   is	   affected	   by	   people	   or	  things.’16	  But	  if	  affect	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  subject,	  then	  it	  also	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  the	   object.	   Affect,	   as	   Guattari	   describes	   it,	   is	   ‘a	   pre-­‐personal	   category,	   installed	  “before”	   the	   circumscription	   of	   identities,	   and	   manifested	   by	   unlocatable	  transferences,	  unlocatable	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  origin	  as	  well	  as	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  destination’.17	  As	   Seigworth	  points	  out,	   the	  unlocatability	  of	   affect	  means	   that	   it	   is	  best	  conceived	  as	  ‘a-­‐subjective/a-­‐objective,	  or,	  again	  following	  Guattari,	  maybe	  it	  is	  less	  that	  affect	  has	  no	  place	  than	  that	  it	  is	  potentially	  there	  in	  every	  place,	  immanent:	  half	   subject,	   half	   object,	   and	   so,	   immanently	   inter-­‐sub-­‐/objective’.18	   Subsequently,	  thinking	   of	   noise	   as	   affect	   allows	   us	   to	   understand	   noise	   as	   having	   an	   existence	  independent	  from	  particular	  subjects	  or	  objects	  that	  it	  may	  enter	  into	  relation	  with.	  To	   be	   sure,	   no	   sound	   is	   inherently	   ‘noise’	   or	   ‘noisy’.	   Rather,	   certain	   entities—vibrations,	  sounds,	  data,	  frequencies—may	  become	  noise	  ‘carriers’,	  in	  functioning	  as	  an	  interference.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  more	  useful	  to	  think	  of	  noise	  in	  terms	  of	  effects,	  rather	  than	  causes:	  noise	  is	  an	  affect	  with	  effects.	  Noise	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  functioning	  on	  an	  affective	  register,	  insomuch	  that	  it	  works	   to	   modulate	   bodily	   states.	   It	   should	   be	   noted,	   however,	   that	   within	   this	  context,	  the	  term	  ‘body’	  does	  not	  only	  refer	  to	  the	  individual	  human	  body	  (the	  body-­‐as-­‐subject).	  Noise	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  affect	  the	  body	  in	  its	  broadest	  sense,	  as	  it	  is	  defined	   by	   seventeenth-­‐century	   Dutch	   philosopher,	   Benedict	   de	   Spinoza.19	   The	  Spinozan	  body	  reflects	  a	  deviation	  from	  Cartesian	  dualism.	  For	  the	  Cartesian	  subject,	  mind	   and	   body	   are	   distinct	   substances,	   but	   they	   interact	   causally.	   Changes	   in	   the	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mind	   can	   generate	   changes	   in	   the	   body	   and	  physical	   changes	   can	   produce	  mental	  ones.	   In	   Spinoza’s	   thesis,	   by	   contrast,	   these	   two	   entities—thought	   and	   the	   mind,	  action	   and	   the	   body—are	   proposed	   as	   equal	   and	   parallel	   planes,	   they	   exist	   as	  different	  expressions	  of	  the	  same	  substance.	  In	  turn,	  the	  dualism	  between	  body	  and	  mind	   is	   collapsed,	   insomuch	   that	  body	  and	  mind	  are	  not	   two	  aspects	  of	  one	   thing,	  but,	   rather,	   they	   exist	   as	   one	   thing—a	   single,	   universal	   and	   infinite	   substance—expressed	   in	   different	   ways.	   Body	   and	   mind	   are	   two	   distinct	   modifications	   (or	  modes)	   of	   a	   single	   substance.	   For	   Spinoza,	   this	   substance	   has	   infinite	   ‘attributes’.	  The	  attribute	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  substance	  (that	  is,	  the	  expressing	  agent).	  However,	  we	  only	  know	  two	  of	   these	  attributes:	   thought	  and	  extension.	  The	  mind	  obeys	   the	  laws	  of	  thought	  while	  the	  body	  obeys	  the	  laws	  of	  extension—of	  movement	  and	  rest.	  Since	  the	  body	  and	  the	  mind	  are	  parallel	  and	  equal	  expressions,	  one	  principle	  must	  be	  matched	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  other.	  The	  structure	  and	  function	  of	  the	  mind	  has	  a	  parallel	   relationship	   to	   the	   structure	   and	   function	   of	   the	   body;	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  mind’s	  thought	  must	  be	  affirmed	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  body’s	  action.	  If	   the	   body	   and	   mind	   are	   different	   expressions	   of	   the	   same	   substance,	   then	  bodies	  cannot	  be	  differentiated	  by	  an	  appeal	  to	  individual	  essences.	  In	  its	  Spinozan	  conception,	   the	   body	   cannot	   be	   defined	   as	   a	   static,	   complete	   unit	   with	   a	   stable	  internal	  structure;	  it	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  bordered,	  autonomous	  subject.	  Rather,	  the	  body	  is	  defined	  in	  accordance	  with	  two	  principles.	  First,	  a	  body	  consists	  of	  a	  series	  of	  dynamic	  relations:	   ‘bodies	  are	  distinguished	  from	  one	  another	  in	  respect	  of	  motion	  and	   rest,	   quickness	   and	   slowness,	   and	   not	   in	   respect	   of	   substance’.20	   A	   body,	  irrespective	  of	  size,	  is	  a	  composite	  of	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  particles.	  These	  particles,	  which	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  simple	  bodies,	  exist	   in	  relations	  of	  motion	  and	  rest,	  of	  speed	  and	  slowness.	  Second,	  a	  body	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  affective	  capacity:	  its	  power	  to	  act	   upon	   and	   be	   acted	   upon	   by	   other,	   distinct,	   bodies.	   A	   body,	   be	   it	   simple	   or	  composite,	   is	   set	   in	  motion	   at	   a	   specific	   rate	   of	   speed	   or	   slowness	   through	   being	  acted	  upon	  by	  another	  body	  in	  motion.	  This	  body	  can	  also	  set	  other	  bodies	  in	  motion	  at	  a	  specific	  rate	  of	  speed	  or	  slowness.	  	  Spinoza’s	   thesis	   allows	   for	   a	   non-­‐anthropocentric	   notion	   of	   the	   body;	   in	  understanding	   the	   body	   as	   a	   dynamic	   assemblage	   of	   relations	   between	   smaller	  bodies,	   which	   has	   the	   capacity	   to	   affect	   and	   be	   affected,	   the	   body	   is	   not	   simply	  limited	  to	  its	  organic	  manifestations,	  nor	  is	   it	  defined	  by	  its	  capacity	  for	  thought.	  A	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body	  may	  be	  the	  human	  body,	  or	  an	  animal-­‐body,	  but	  it	  may	  also	  be	  a	  social-­‐body,	  a	  sound-­‐body,	  or	  a	  linguistic-­‐body.	  A	  crowd,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  single,	  discrete	  body,	  composed	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  smaller	  bodies.	  Moreover,	  the	  body,	  and	  the	  structure	  and	  speed	  of	  its	  dynamic	  relations,	  are	  always	  subject	  to	  change:	  what	  we	  recognise	  as	  a	  body	   is	  only	  a	   temporary,	  stable	  relationship.	  The	  body	  remains	  open	  to	  the	  future;	  its	  relations	  are	  composed	  and	  recomposed.	  More	  human-­‐bodies	  may	   join	  the	  crowd-­‐body	  as	  other	  human-­‐bodies	  break	  off.	  The	  composition	  of	   the	  crowd	  body	  may	   radically	   change	  when	   it	   is	   acted	  upon	  by,	   for	   example,	   a	  police-­‐body.	   Since	   the	   body	   necessarily	   remains	   open	   to	   change,	   we	   cannot	   know	   for	  certain	  what	  forms	  the	  body	  may	  take,	  the	  extent	  of	  its	  power,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  may	  affect	  and	  be	  affected.	  We	  cannot	  say	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  body,	  for	  ‘no	  one	  has	  yet	  determined	  what	  a	  body	  can	  do’.21	  If	   noise	   is	   that	   which	   acts	   upon	   the	   (Spinozan)	   body,	   inducing	   a	   change	   in	  relations,	  then	  noise	  does	  not	  only	  impact	  upon	  human	  lives.	  Rather,	  noise	  is	  able	  to	  affect	   other	   body-­‐formations:	   a	   cellular	   collective,	   an	   individual,	   a	   crowd,	   a	  population,	   a	   city,	   a	   computer,	   voice	   recognition	   technologies,	   a	   society,	   a	   feast	   of	  rats.	   Take	   for	   example,	   the	  Mosquito,	   a	   device	   that	   emits	   an	   uncomfortable,	   high-­‐pitched	  frequency	  around	  17khz.	  Operating	  on	  similar	  principles	  as	  ultrasonic	  pest	  control	  devices,	  the	  Mosquito	  device	  is	  used	  to	  dispel	  socially	  ‘undesirable’	  groups	  of	  young	  people	  from	  public	  spaces	  and	  prevent	  them	  congregating	  in	  particular	  areas.	  The	  device	  targets	  a	  particular	  demographic	  according	  to	  age;	  the	  sound	  is	  designed	  to	  be	  heard	  by	  those	  under	  twenty-­‐five,	  since	  the	  bandwidth	  of	  audible	  frequencies	  deteriorates	  with	  age.	  It	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  the	  high-­‐pitched	  frequency	  is	  inherently	  ‘noisy’	   but	   that	   such	   a	   device	   is	   designed	   to	   function	   as	   noise:	   it	   is	   designed	   to	  interfere	  in	  its	  target’s	  lives,	  to	  interrupt	  the	  formation	  of	  crowd-­‐bodies.	  As	  such,	  the	  device	  acts	  upon	  both	  the	  individual	  body	  of	  a	  young	  person	  and	  the	  composite	  body	  of	  ‘youths’	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  dispel.	  Similarly,	  Steve	  Goodman	  has	  discussed	  the	  role	  of	  acoustic	  force	  as	  a	  means	  of	  modulating	  the	  fear	  of	  populations;	  fear	  not	  only	  as	  an	  individual,	   subjective	  emotion	  or	   feeling	  but	  also	  a	   collective	  mood.	   In	  2005,	   sonic	  booms	  were	  deployed	  indiscriminately	  against	  the	  civilian	  populations	  that	  inhabit	  the	   Gaza	   strip.	   These	   were	   reported	   to	   cause	   stress,	   panic	   attacks,	   miscarriages,	  heart	  problems	  and	  nose	  bleeds.22	  By	  indiscriminately	  disturbing	  the	  smaller	  bodies,	  of	   individuals,	   families,	   schools	   and	   local	   communities,	   sonic	   booms	   also	   act	   upon	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the	  larger,	  collective,	  population-­‐body;	  they	  send	  shockwaves	  through	  communities,	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  general	  ambiance	  of	  fear	  or	  dread.	  However,	  the	  deployment	  of	  sonic	  booms	   and	   other	   acoustic	  weapons	   ‘threatens	   not	   just	   the	   traumatised	   emotional	  disposition	   and	   physiology	   of	   the	   population	   but	   the	   very	   structure	   of	   the	   built	  environment’.23	   In	  Gaza,	   for	   example,	   there	  were	   also	   reports	   of	   broken	  windows,	  cracked	  walls	  and	  structural	  damage	  to	  buildings.	  In	  turn,	  noise	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  affective	  force	  that	  traverses	  normative	  dualisms	  between	  the	  body	  and	  mind,	  individual	  and	  collective,	  subject	  and	  object.	  Noise	  draws	  no	  distinction	  between	  a	  body’s	  organic	   and	  non-­‐organic	   components,	   between	   the	  walls	  of	   Jericho	  and	   the	  populace	  it	  contains:	  all	  are	  acted	  upon	  by	  noise.24	  Understanding	  noise	  in	  this	  way,	  as	   that	  which	   can	   impact	   upon	   and	   induce	   change	   in	   a	   body’s	   series	   of	   relations,	  significantly	  differs	   from	  the	  notion	  of	  noise	  as	  a	  (human)	   judgement	  of	  sound,	   for	  the	  ear	  of	   the	  beholder	   is	  no	   longer	   the	  privileged	  site	  of	  noise.	   It	   runs	  against	   the	  idea	   that	   there	   can	   be	   ‘no	   noise	   …	   without	   listening’.25	   Rather,	   as	   an	   affective	  interruption,	   noise	   has	   an	   existence	   that	   does	   not	   rely	   on	   affirmation	   through	   the	  ear,	  the	  eye	  and	  human	  perception	  more	  generally.	  	  
—BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: NOISE, SILENCE AND AESTHETIC MORALISM  Thus	  far	  we	  have	  primarily	  focused	  on	  noise’s	  negative	  effects:	  its	  ability	  to	  destroy,	  diminish	   or	   annoy.	   These	   effects	   are	  what	   allows	   noise’s	   interruptions	   to	   become	  unwanted,	   as	   Garret	   Keizer	   notes:	   ‘to	   human	   beings,	   some	   sounds	   are	   just	   noise.	  Some	  sounds	  interrupt	  their	  sleep,	  damage	  their	  hearing,	  raise	  their	  blood	  pressure,	  slow	  their	  children’s	  progress	  at	  school,	  and	  banish	  the	  sweet	  thoughts	  and	  tender	  feelings	  they	  harbor	  towards	  sex.	  Those	  sounds	  are	  unwanted.’26	  However,	  to	  return	  to	  where	  we	  began,	   thinking	  about	  noise	  as	  affect	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  decoupling	  noise	   from	   a	   definitive	   ‘badness’	   or	   ‘un-­‐ness’	   (noise	   as	   unwanted,	   undesirable,	  unintentional,	   unordered	   or	   unpermitted),	   allowing	   a	   reconsideration	   of	   certain	  normative,	  ethico-­‐aesthetic	  associations.	  	  Noise	   is	   typically	   thought	   of	   as	   negative;	   and,	   as	   such,	   is	   placed	   in	   binaristic	  opposition	   to	   that	   which	   it	   is	   not.	   Paul	   Hegarty,	   for	   example,	   states:	   ‘noise	   is	   a	  negativity:	   defined	   in	   opposition	   to	   something	   else,	   for	   example,	   meaning,	   music,	  structure,	  skill,	  beauty,	  etc.	  Historically,	   it	  has	  been	  thought	  of	  as	   literally	  negative:	  “that’s	   just	  noise”.’27	  As	  sound	  that	   is	  unwanted,	  noise	   is	  defined	  in	  relation	  to	  that	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which	  it	  is	  not:	  wanted.	  However,	  these	  dualisms	  that	  have	  constituted	  noise	  can	  tell	  of	   deeply	   embedded	   ideological	   presuppositions	   that	   are	   both	   powerful	   and	  troubling.	   The	   dichotomy	   of	   noise	   and	   silence,	   for	   example,	   frequently	   becomes	  synonymous	  with	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  urban	  and	  the	  rural,	   the	  natural	  and	  the	   manufactured,	   the	   present	   and	   the	   past.	   Silence	   is	   instilled	   with	   a	   spiritual	  tranquility,	  tranquillity	  is	  equated	  with	  the	  natural,	  and	  the	  natural	  is	  equated	  with	  the	  beautiful.	   It	   is	  romanticised	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	   lost,	  better	  time,	  which	  remained	  unbroken	  by	  the	  sounds	  of	  machines,	  the	  presence	  of	  anti-­‐social	  teenagers	  and	  the	  outpourings	  of	  around-­‐the-­‐clock	  entertainment;	  the	  contemporary	  culture	  of	  noise.	  R.	  Murray	  Schafer,	  for	  example,	  laments	  the	  saturation	  of	  the	  soundscape	  with	  noise	  that	   has	   caused	   the	   death	   of,	   sonically	   speaking,	   a	   better	   time,	   a	   time	   in	   which	  silence	  was	  still	  prominent	  in	  everyday	  life:	  	  In	   the	   past	   were	   muted	   sancturies	   where	   anyone	   suffering	   from	   sound	  fatigue	   could	  go	   into	   retirement	   for	   recomposure	  of	   the	  psyche	  …	  at	  one	  time	  stillness	  was	  a	  precious	  article	  in	  an	  unwritten	  code	  of	  human	  rights.	  Man	   had	   reservoirs	   of	   stillness	   in	   his	   life	   to	   restore	   the	   spiritual	  metabolism.	  Even	  in	  the	  hearts	  of	  cities	  there	  were	  dark,	  still	  churches	  and	  libraries,	  or	  the	  privacy	  of	  drawing	  room	  and	  bedroom.	  Outside	  the	  throb	  of	   cities,	   the	   countryside	  was	   accessible	  with	   its	   lulling	  whirr	   of	   natural	  sounds.	  There	  will	  still	  times	  too.	  The	  holy	  days	  were	  quieter	  before	  they	  became	   holidays.	   In	   North	   America,	   Sunday	   became	   Fun-­‐day.	   The	  importance	  of	  these	  quiet	  groves	  and	  times	  far	  transcended	  the	  particular	  purposes	   to	   which	   they	  were	   put.	  We	   can	   comprehend	   this	   clearly	   only	  now	  that	  we	  have	  lost	  them.28	  	  While	  silence	  is	  construed	  as	  ‘natural’,	  noise,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  distinctly	  ‘unnatural’.	  It	  is	  heard	  as	  the	  product	  of	  urbanisation	  and	  capitalism;	  it	  belongs	  to	  the	  city	  and	  the	  industry.	  It	  lies	  on	  the	  side	  of	  pollution,	  damage	  and	  distraction;	  it	  is	  that	  which	  is	  to	  be	  silenced.	  While	  silence	  is	  posited	  as	  enhancing	  concentration,	  inducing	  calmness,	  and	  allowing	  contemplation,	  noise	  is	  detrimental	  to	  our	  quality	  of	  life.	  Noise,	  we	  are	  told,	  blocks	  thought,	  or,	  rather,	  blocks	  ‘proper’	  thought.	  The	  generation	  of	  teenagers	  and	  young	  adults	  who	  insist	  on	  listening	  to	  music	  on	  a	  near-­‐constant	  basis	  remain	  in	  a	  state	  of	  inattentiveness:	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Thought	  is	  an	  essentially	  silent	  activity	  and	  is	  difficult	  to	  sustain	  in	  a	  noisy	  society—and	  certainly	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  superficial	  when	  competing	  with	  other	  stimuli.	  This	  cannot	  be	  good	  for	  our	  collective	  cultural	  health.29	  	  The	  message	  is	  loud	  and	  clear:	  noise	  and	  silence	  have	  a	  moral	  content.	  Noise	  denies	  the	   ‘human	   right’	   of	   silence.	   It	   marks	   a	   lack	   of	   consideration	   and	   respect	   for	  neighbours,	  communities	  and	  environments.	  It	  is	  silence	  that	  needs	  protection	  from	  noise	   and	   not	   vice	   versa—it	   would	   seem	   strange	   to	   lament	   the	   loss	   of	   noise	   to	  silence.	  As	  Stuart	  Sim	  argues,	  ‘noise	  must	  never	  be	  allowed	  to	  overwhelm	  silence	  …	  we	  certainly	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  destroy	  silence,	  and	  do	  so	  only	  too	  readily—and	  too	  casually’.30	  Silence	  is	  a	  ‘good’	  that	  is	  broken	  by	  ‘bad’	  noise.	  These	  dichotomisations	  of	  silence/noise	  and	  their	  categorical	  assimilation	  with	  constructions	   of	   past/present,	   nature/city,	   concentration	   /distraction,	   oppressed/	  oppressor,	   tranquillity/disturbance	   and,	   ultimately,	   a	   moral	   register	   of	   good/bad,	  however,	  risk	  assuming	  there	  to	  be	  standard	  or	  shared	  reactions	  to	  particular	  sonic	  environments.	   In	   turn,	   the	  politics	  of	   silence	  and	  politics	  of	  noise	   tend	   to	  overlook	  those	  individuals,	  generations	  and	  communities	  who	  do	  not	  fit	  this	  affective	  model;	  those	   who	   do	   not	   share	   the	   aesthetic	   preference	   for	   silence	   or	   the	   sensations	   of	  those	   who	   find	   what	   are	   typically	   thought	   of	   as	   noisy	   environments	   disturbing,	  irritating	  or	  distracting.	   For	   example,	  while	   there	  has	  been	   significant	   attention	   to	  the	  use	  of	  noise	  as	  a	  means	  of	  torture,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  torturous	  silence	  of	  enforced	  solitary	  confinement.	  Silence	  can	  be	   just	  as	  alienating	  or	  disturbing	  as	  noise.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  moralising	  polemics	  of	  silence	  often	  omit	  questions	  of	  silencing,	  of	  who	  is	  the	  bringer	  of	  noise	  for	  whom?	  Who	  is	  to	  be	  kept	  silent?	  Is	  it	  the	  ‘noisy’	  foreigners?	  The	   ‘gossiping’	   women?	   Who	   is	   it	   that	   has	   laid	   claims	   to	   silence,	   who	   are	   its	  gatekeepers	  and	  regulators,	  and	  who	  is	  it	  that	  silence	  abates—is	  silence	  elective	  or	  oppressive?	   The	   silence	   of	   transcendental	   thought	   or	   the	   silence	   of	   protest?	   For	  whom	  is	  silence	  a	  ‘human	  right’	  and	  for	  whom	  is	  silence	  a	  violation	  of	  those	  rights?	  	  Anahid	   Kassabian’s	   work	   on	   ubiquitous	   listening	   has	   drawn	   attention	   to	   the	  problems	  with	   such	   generalisations	   about	   experiences	   of	   and	   with	   sound.	  Within	  discourses	   of	   musical	   reception	   there	   has	   been	   a	   marked	   tendency	   to	   conflate	  listening	  with	  attention	  and	  attention	  with	  consciousness.	  This	  presumption	  guides,	  for	   example,	   the	   normative	   paradigm	   of	   structural	   listening	   and	   its	   purported	  opposition	  to	  passive,	  inattentive	  listening.	  Contra	  this	  conflation,	  Kassabian	  argues	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that	   there	   are	  many	   kinds	   of	   listening,	  with	  modulating	   degrees	   of	   consciousness,	  attentiveness	   and	   affectivity.	   In	   short,	   listening	   does	   not	   have	   to	   be	   attentive	   or	  conscious,	   nor	   does	   it	   have	   to	   be	   attentive	   or	   conscious	   to	   have	   an	   impact	   on	  our	  bodies	   and,	   ultimately,	   how	   we	   ‘feel’.	   Thus	   it	   is	   not	   so	   much	   that	   teenagers	   who	  surround	   themselves	   with	   music	   are	   incapable	   of	   anything	   beyond	   superficial	  thought.	  Rather,	  as	  Kassabian	  states:	  	  Those	   of	   us	   living	   in	   industrialised	   settings	   have	   developed,	   from	   the	  omnipresence	  of	  music	   in	  our	  daily	   lives,	   a	  mode	  of	   listening	  dissociated	  from	   specific	   generic	   characteristics	   of	   the	  music.	   In	   this	  mode	  we	   listen	  ‘alongside’	  or	  simultaneous	  with	  other	  activities.31	  Thus	  while	   there	   are	   those	  who	   think	   of	   themselves	   as	   requiring	   silence	   to	  work,	  there	  are	  also	  those	  who	  prefer	  work	  ‘alongside’	  sound	  and	  music.	  There	  are	  those	  who	   use	   sound	   and	  music	   to	   ‘fill	   the	   deadly	   silences’,	   to	  make	   the	   prospect	   of	   an	  empty	  house	  less	  daunting.	  There	  are	  even	  those	  who	  prefer	  to	  sleep	  with	  sound—there	  are	  an	  abundance	  of	  sleep	  sound	  devices,	  CDs	  and,	  more	  recently,	  smartphone	  apps	   available	   that	   are	  marketed	   to	   help	   the	   listener	   fall	   asleep.32	   Along	  with	   the	  predictable	  repertoire	  of	   ‘natural’	  soothing	  sounds—whale	  song,	  rainforest	  sounds,	  waves	   crashing,	   stream	   sounds—there	   are	   sounds	   available	   that	   are	   altogether	  ‘unnatural’,	  and	  might	  typically	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  hindrance	  to	  sleep—the	  sound	  of	  fans,	  highway	   traffic	  and	  air	  conditioning	  units,	   for	  example.	  Similarly,	  white	  noise	  machines	   may	   be	   used	   to	   mask	   other	   noises;	   such	   devices	   interrupt	   potential	  interruptions,	  preventing	  them	  from	  disturbing	  the	  listener.	  	  Sound	   created	  by	   an	   individual	   in	   their	   own	  domestic	   space	   is	   one	   thing,	   but	  noise	   intruding	   from	   somewhere	   else	   is	   altogether	   different.	   Keizer	   argues	   that	  noise	  is	  a	  marker	  of	  social	  inequality,	  insomuch	  that	  it	  disproportionately	  affects	  the	  socially	   and	   politically	   ‘weak’:	   the	   elderly,	   children,	   the	   sick,	   racial	   minorities,	  neurological	  minorities,	  prisoners	  and	  the	  poor.33	  The	  urban	  poor,	  for	  example,	  tend	  to	  be	  condemned	   to	  noisy	  neighborhoods,	  whereas	  quietness	   remains	  a	   luxury	   for	  those	  who	  can	  afford	  it.	  Keizer	  warns	  against	  naive	  generalisations,	  the	  ‘callous	  and	  condescending	   assumption’	   that	   those	   living	   in	   poorer	   neighborhoods	   are	   happy	  with	  the	  levels	  of	  noise	  because	  ‘it’s	  what	  “those”	  people	  do.	  “It’s	  their	  culture”.	  Their	  ears	   are	   different.’34	   Yet	   equally,	   what	   happens	   when	   the	   interrupting	   sounds	   of	  neighbours	   becomes	   part	   of	   familiar	   everyday	   life?	   To	   return	   to	  my	   earlier	   claim	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that	   it	   would	   seem	   strange	   to	   lament	   the	   loss	   of	   noise	   to	   silence,	   in	   Jacqueline	  Waldock’s	   research	   on	   Liverpool’s	   sound	   environment	   a	   number	   of	   participants	  from	  Toxteth’s	  Welsh	  streets	  (an	  area	  of	  housing	  currently	  due	  for	  demolition)	  have	  commented	   on	   missing	   the	   sounds	   of	   their	   neighbours	   after	   they	   have	   been	  (forcibly)	  relocated	  to	  ‘better’	  housing	  with	  thicker	  walls.	  Participant	  Mrs	  T.	  states:	  	  I	  always	  used	  to	  hear	  the	  neighbours	  through	  the	  walls.	  I	  could	  hear	  them,	  and	  they	  could	  hear	  me.	  It	  made	  me	  feel	  safe	  knowing	  that	  someone	  would	  hear	  me	  if	  I	  fell	  or	  they	  would	  check	  on	  me	  if	  they	  couldn’t	  hear	  me	  moving	  or	  I	  would	  check	  on	  them	  if	  I	  heard	  a	  thump	  or	  a	  scream.35	  Similarly,	   participant	   N.,	   when	   commenting	   on	   a	   recording	   of	   the	   sounds	   of	   her	  neighbours	  coming	  through	  the	  wall,	  said	  ‘it’s	  the	  sound	  of	  community	  and	  sharing’.	  As	   Waldock	   argues,	   the	   participant’s	   relationship	   with	   the	   sounds	   of	   their	  neighbours	  ‘differs	  greatly	  from	  the	  assumed	  norm	  of	  annoyance	  at	  neighbours	  who	  invade	  the	  private	  domestic	  space	  of	  others’.36	  To	  summarise:	  just	  as	  silence	  is	  not	  always	  felt	  as	  ‘good’,	  noise	  is	  not	  always	  felt	  as	   ‘bad’.	   It	   has	   already	   been	   suggested	   that	   noise	   is	   productive	   insomuch	   that	   it	  generates	   a	   response,	   and	   these	   responses	   may	   range	   from	   barely	   noticeable	  modulations	   to	  a	   radical	   change	  of	   systemic	   relations.	  However,	   it	  does	  not	   follow	  that	   the	   change	   that	  noise	   induces	   is	   always	   ‘bad’	  or	  a	   tarnishing	  of	   a	  pre-­‐existing	  ‘good’—the	   disturbance	   of	   the	   ‘nice’	   quiet	   neighbourhood	   by	   unwelcome	  newcomers.	  While	  noise	  undeniably	  can	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  upon	  people’s	  lives	  (and,	  undoubtedly,	  upon	  some	  people’s	  lives	  more	  than	  others),	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	   noise	   is	  definitively	   negative.	   Likewise,	   recognising	   noise	   as	   productive	   is	   not	  the	   same	  as	   saying	   that	  noise	   is	  positive.	  Rather,	  noise’s	   ‘badness’	   or	   ‘goodness’	   is	  contingent.	   Thinking	   of	   noise	   as	   affect	   allows	   space	   for	   this	   contingency—it	  recognises	   noise’s	   ‘goodness’	   or	   ‘badness’	   as	   secondary	   and	   relational.	   In	   order	   to	  expand	  on	  this,	  we	  will	  briefly	  return	  to	  Spinozan	  body.	  	  For	   Spinoza,	   there	   are	   no	   universal,	   moral	   values	   of	   good	   or	   evil.	   Instead,	  morality	   is	   replaced	   with	   an	   ethical	   order.	   Good	   and	   bad	   are	   understood	   as	  relational:	  what	  we	  call	   ‘good’	   is	  that	  which	  enhances	  the	  power	  of	  the	  body	  to	  act	  (thus	  having	  a	  positive	  affect)	  whereas	  what	  we	  call	   ‘bad’	   is	   that	  which	  diminishes	  the	  power	  of	  the	  body	  to	  act	  (thus	  having	  a	  negative	  affect).	  Take,	  for	  example,	  food.	  On	  one	  hand,	  food-­‐body	  may	  have	  a	  positive	  relation	  with	  our	  body.	  As	  we	  consume	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the	   food-­‐body,	   compounding	   it	   with	   ours,	   it	   gives	   us	   energy	   and	   nourishment.	   In	  short,	  it	  increases	  our	  power.	  But	  we	  may	  have	  a	  negative	  encounter	  with	  the	  food-­‐body.	  Our	  body	  may	  have	  an	  allergic	  reaction	  to	  the	  food,	  causing	  the	  relations	  of	  the	  body	  to	  deteriorate.	  There	  is	  nothing	  inherently	  good	  or	  evil	  about	  food,	  irrespective	  of	   the	  benefit	  or	  harm	   it	  may	  cause.	  Rather,	  whether	  or	  not	   food	   is	   ‘good’	  or	   ‘bad’,	  that	  is,	  beneficial	  or	  harmful,	  is	  determined	  by	  its	  relations	  with	  other	  bodies.	  Likewise,	   there	   is	  nothing	   inherently	   evil,	   torturous,	   violent	   or	   fascistic	   about	  noise,	   irrespective	  of	  the	  rhetorical	   force	  it	   is	  afforded	  or	  the	  means	  that	   it	  may	  be	  put	  to.	  Noise	  may	  annoy	  us	  and	  infuriate	  us	  but	  it	  may	  also	  help	  us	  sleep,	  or	  instil	  us	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  community	  and	  belonging.	  Noise	   is	   like	  Derrida’s	  Pharmakon—is	   it	  poison	  or	  is	  it	  cure?37	  Both,	  perhaps,	  depending	  on	  how	  it	  is	  taken.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Attali	  notes	  that	  while	  noise	  has	  often	  been	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  weapon	  of	  death,	  as	  a	  source	  of	  pain,	   violence	  and	  destruction,	   it	  has	  also	   long	  been	  considered	   to	  have	  a	   curative	  function:	   ‘noise	   has	   always	   been	   perceived	   as	   a	   source	   of	   exaltation,	   a	   kind	   of	  therapeutic	   drug	   capable	   of	   curing	   tarantula	   bites,	   or	   according	   to	   Boissier	   de	  Sauvages	   (in	  his	  Nosologica	  metholodica)	   “fourteen	   forms	  of	  melancholy”’.38	  Noise,	  accordingly,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  not	  only	  diminish	  bodies,	  as	  in,	  for	  example,	  the	  use	  of	  sonic	  and	  vibrational	  weaponry	  to	  disperse	  the	  particles	  of	  crowd-­‐bodies,	  but	  also	  to	   enhance	   the	   power	   of	   the	   body,	   insomuch	   that	   it	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   create	  affirmative	   and	   positive	   affections	   and	   responses.	   And	   this	   positive	   potential	   has	  been	  readily	  explored	  in	  the	  arts.	  	  
—THE JOYS OF NOISE  The	   ‘joys	   of	   noise’,	   as	   the	   composer	   Henry	   Cowell	   puts	   it,	   have	   been	   one	   of	   the	  dominant	  themes	  of	  twentieth-­‐	  and	  twenty-­‐first-­‐century	  aesthetics	  from	  the	  typical	  (albeit	   problematic)	   lineage	   of	   ‘noise’	   that	   is	   drawn	   through	   the	   Futurists,	   Varese,	  
musique	   concrète,	   Cage,	   Dada,	   Fluxus,	   industrial	   music,	   drone,	   free	   Jazz,	   Japanese	  noise	  music	  and	  glitch,	  to	  circuit	  bending,	  record	  scratching	  and	  the	  popular	  use	  of	  gain,	  distortion	  and	  feedback	  in	  guitar	  playing.	  Here,	  the	  irritating	  ring	  of	  tinnitus,	  or	  the	   Mosquito	   become	   the	   Royji	   Ikeda’s	   intricate,	   infrasonic	   compositions.	   The	  scratched,	  skipping	  compact	  disc	  becomes	  Yasuamo	  Tone’s	  Wounded	  CDs.	  Many	  of	  these	  practices	  tend	  to	  be	  placed	  under	  the	  quasi-­‐idiomatic	  banner	  of	  ‘noise	  music’,	  a	   term	   typically	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   number	   of	   geographically,	   historically	   and	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generically	   disparate	   practices	   that	   seemingly	   share	   common	   terrain	   in	   utilising	  noise,	  concepts	  of	  noise	  and	  noisy	  sounds	  as	  artistic	  resources.	  	  If	  noise	  pertains	   to	  unwanted,	  meaningless	  or	  non-­‐musical	   sound,	   then	   ‘noise	  music’	   exists	   as	   a	   paradox.	   It	   arises	   from	   between	   the	   wanted	   and	   unwanted,	  between	  the	  desirable	  and	  undesirable,	  between	  music	  and	  noise.	  Often,	  artistic	  uses	  of	  noise	  have	  been	  supported	  by	  notions	  of	  taboo	  breaking	  and	  transgression.	  Noise	  music	   crosses	   the	   line.	   It	   brings	   inside	   what	   is	   to	   be	   left	   outside,	   it	   threatens	  musicality,	   threatens	   sonic	   conventions	   and	   threatens	   its	   audience	   with	   the	   raw	  ‘shock’	   that	   is	   noise.	   But	   in	   these	   instances	   noise	   can	  never	   really	   be	   noise:	   it	   can	  never	  truly	  be	  unwanted,	  if	  it	  is	  defined	  as	  such.	  It	  remains	  trapped	  in	  the	  musical,	  as	  a	  simulacrum	  of	  noise	  proper.	  In	   Attali’s	   Noise:	   The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Music	   noise	   is	   posited	   as	  transgressive,	   insomuch	   that	   it	   exists	   as	   a	   violent	   freedom	   that	   is	   external	   to	   but	  nevertheless	  threatens	  the	  repressive	  violence	  of	  society.	  Music,	  by	  contrast,	  stands	  as	  a	  prophetic	  reflection	  of	  social	  orders:	  shifts	  in	  musical	  production	  and	  form	  pre-­‐empt	   changes	   in	   social	   organisation.	   Noise,	   understood	   as	   uncoded	   disorder,	  threatens	   and	   disrupts	   established	   musical	   orders.	   However,	   noise’s	   violent	  destruction	  of	  the	  old	  also	  heralds	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  new;	  a	  new	  musical	  order	  emerges	   from	   the	   disruption	   of	   established	   codes.	   Thus	   ‘despite	   the	   death	   it	  contains,	   noise	   carries	   order	   within	   itself;	   it	   carries	   new	   information’.39	   Noise	  mutates	  the	  structures	  it	  disrupts,	  transforming	  the	  relationship	  between	  music	  and	  noise	   in	   the	   process.	  While	   noise	   remains	   bound	   to	   a	   dualism	   that	   separates	   the	  inside	   and	   outside	   of	   an	   established	   structure—noise	   is	   uncoded	   sound	   that	   lies	  outside	  the	  sphere	  of	  coded	  sound,	  noise	  is	  chaos	  to	  music’s	  order—the	  relationship	  between	  noise	  and	  music	  remains	  a	  dynamic	  process;	  a	  cycle	  of	  absorption,	  of	  noise	  into	   music.	   Music	   exists	   as	   noise	   codified	   and	   organised,	   disarmed	   of	   its	   violent,	  disruptive	   potential:	   ‘noise	   is	   a	  weapon	   and	  music,	   primordially,	   is	   the	   formation,	  domestication,	  and	  ritualisation	  of	  that	  weapon	  as	  a	  simulacrum	  of	  ritual	  murder’.40	  Thus	  noise	  necessarily	   loses	   its	   noisiness	   as	   it	   is	   channelled	   into	  music	   over	   time.	  The	  future	  musical	  orders	  that	  noise	  contains	  are	  only	  brought	  into	  actuality	  as	  it	  is	  absorbed	  by	  music.	  Noise,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  exist	  in,	  or	  rather,	  as	  music,	  has	  to	  be	  sacrificed.	  Noise,	  as	  it	  is	  brought	  inside	  from	  the	  outside,	  becomes	  a	  shadow	  of	  itself.	  The	  new	  music	  is	  the	  once-­‐was-­‐noise,	  stripped	  of	  its	  primary,	  transgressive	  power.	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If	  we	  define	  noise	  according	  to	  such	  dualisms—uncoded	  to	  coded,	  unwanted	  to	  wanted,	   chaos	   to	   order—then	   noise,	   when	   it	   becomes	   art,	   or	   music,	   is	   always	  destined	  to	  fail.	  Paul	  Hegarty,	  echoing	  Attali,	  notes:	  	  ‘failure’	   is	  what	  defines	  noise	   in	   its	  encounter	  with	  music,	   for	  noise	  must	  fail	   to	  be	  noise	   if	   it	   is	  accepted,	  and	  of	  course	   it	   fails	   if	  not	  heard	  as	  well.	  This	   failure	   is	   where	   noise	   resides,	   the	   fate	   it	   selects	   for	   itself,	   or	   has	  selected	   for	   it.	   Noise	   must	   be	   only	   as	   if	   it	   were	   music,	   not	   as	   a	   new	  musicality.41	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  noise	  music	  ‘succeeds’	  as	  noise,	  then	  it	  fails	  as	  music	  but,	  likewise,	  if	  it	  ‘succeeds’	  as	  music	  then	  it	  must,	  in	  part,	  fail	  as	  noise.	  But	  the	  affective	  definition	  of	  noise	   interrupts	   this	   logic.	   If	  we	  understand	  noise	  as	  an	  affect	  with	  effects,	   then	  the	   noise	   of	   noise	  music	   is	   no	   longer	   restricted	   to	   a	   simulation	   of	   noise	   ‘proper’.	  Rather,	   noise	   music’s	   noises,	   as	   interruptive	   forces	   that	   induce	   change,	   can	   be	  thought	   of,	   on	   one	   level,	   as	   genuine	   noises.	   The	   noise	   of	   noise	   music	   may	   be	  intended,	  it	  may	  be	  desired	  and	  it	  may	  be	  staged	  but,	  given	  that	  noise	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	   of	   as	   affect	   is	   no	   longer	   primarily	   distinguished	   in	   relation	   to	   its	  unwantedness,	   undesirability,	   non-­‐meaning,	   disorder	   and	   so	   on,	   then	   the	  ‘constructedness’	  of	  artistic	  noise	   is	  contingent	  upon	   its	  affectivity.	  We	  should	  also	  remind	   ourselves	   that,	   according	   to	   the	   definition	   outlined,	   noise	   is	   no	   longer	  primarily	  defined	  by	  the	  listener.	  As	  such	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  hear	  something	  as	  noise,	  for	  noise	  to	  be	  present.	  	  In	   ‘the	   Joys	  of	  Noise’,	  Henry	  Cowell	  notes	   ‘the	   ‘disease’	  of	  noise	  permeates	  all	  music	  …	  although	  existing	  in	  all	  music,	  the	  noise-­‐element	  has	  been	  to	  music	  as	  sex	  is	  to	   humanity,	   essential	   to	   its	   existence,	   but	   impolite	   to	   mention,	   something	   to	   be	  cloaked	   by	   ignorance	   and	   silence’.42	   Unlike	   Attali’s	   sacrificed	   once-­‐was-­‐noise,	  Cowell’s	  noise	  lives:	  it	  flows	  throughout	  sounds	  and	  structures	  of	  music,	  modulating	  and	   distorting	   sonorities.	   For	   Cowell,	   noise	   forms	   an	   essential	   underpinning	   for	  climactic	  musical	  moments:	  ‘if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  punctuation	  of	  the	  cymbal	  and	  the	  bass	  drum	  the	  climaxes	  in	  our	  operas	  would	  be	  like	  jelly-­‐fish’.43	  But,	  as	  Cowell	  notes,	  perhaps	  what	  is	  most	  surprising	  is	  the	  contamination	  of	  sounds	  that	  we	  think	  of	  as	  musical.	  To	  be	  sure	  ‘a	  truly	  pure	  tone	  can	  be	  made	  only	  in	  an	  acoustical	  laboratory,	  and	  even	  there	   it	   is	  doubtful	  whether,	  by	   the	   time	  the	   tone	  has	  reached	  our	  ear,	   it	  has	   not	   been	   corrupted	   by	   resonances	   picked	   up	   on	   the	   way’.44	   Infection	   is	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inevitable,	   yet	   the	  micro-­‐noises	   that	   intervene	  with	   the	   transmission	   of	   the	   ‘pure’	  acoustic	   tone	   are	   responsible	   for	   its	   timbral	   qualities;	   one	   need	   only	   think	   of	   the	  common	   assertion	   of	   the	   ‘superiority’	   of	   (noise-­‐infested)	   analogue’s	   ‘warmth’	   and	  ‘fuzziness’,	  over	  the	  cold,	  clean	   ‘perfection’	  of	   the	  digital.	  As	  such,	   ‘the	  only	  hopeful	  course	   is	   to	   consider	   that	   the	   noise-­‐germ,	   like	   the	   bacteria	   of	   cheese,	   is	   a	   good	  microbe,	  which	  may	   provide	   previously	   hidden	   delights	   to	   the	   listener,	   instead	   of	  producing	  musical	  oblivion’.45	  	  We	  can	  infer	  from	  Cowell’s	  proposition	  that	  noise	  music	  does	  not	  pertain	  to	  a	  making	  good	  of	  noise’s	  bad	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  music:	  noise	  music	  does	  not	  just	  use	  the	  negative,	  positively.	  Rather,	  noise	  music	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  foregrounding	  and	   extending	   the	   inevitable	   presence	   of	   noise	   in	   music.	   However,	   at	   this	   point,	  there	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  need	  to	  differentiate	  between	  noise	  as	  it	  refers	  to	  sounds	  that	  are	   ‘noisy’,	  and	  noise	  as	  an	  active	  and	  productive	  process.	  We	  can	  think	  of	  the	  former	   as	   a	   timbral	   descriptor,	   for	   sounds	   that	   we	   hear	   as	   abrasive,	   messy	   or	  distorted.	   ‘Noisy’	  sounds	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  audible	  outcome	  of	  certain	  noise	  processes	  that	  shape	  the	  sound	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  Thus	  when	  a	  sound	  is	  described	  as	  ‘noisy’,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  it	  necessarily	  functions,	  or	  is	  experienced	  as	  noise.	  Circuit	  bending,	   for	   example,	   is	   a	   process	   that	   works	   to	   ‘noisify’	   circuits	   through	   power	  fluctuations,	   crossed	   wires	   and	   the	   modification	   of	   components,	   to	   generate	   new	  potentials	   of	   sounds.	   Subsequently,	   the	   primary	   ‘noise’	   of	   a	   circuit	   bent	   toy	   is	   not	  directly	  heard;	   rather,	   it	   is	  only	   rendered	  perceptible	   through	   its	   sonic	   effects,	   the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  interruptions	  within	  the	  circuit	  modify	  the	  sonic	  output.	  Noise,	  as	  affective	  process,	  thus	  remains	  distinct	  from	  ‘noisy’	  sounds	  that	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  audible	  outcome	  of	   such	  processes.	  More	  broadly,	   this	  distinction	  allows	  us	   to	  recognise	  noises	  that	  function	  on	  numerous	  artistic	  registers.	  It	  allows	  space	  for	  the	  noises	   that	   effect	   the	   generation	   or	   modification	   of	   materials	   that	   may	   be	   only	  audibly	  perceived	  through	  their	  effects,	  or	  may	  not	  be	  perceivable	  at	  all.	  	  
—CONCLUSION: THE NOISE NETWORK  The	   ‘goodness’	   or	   ‘badness’	   of	   noise,	   its	   wantedness	   or	   unwantedness,	   its	  intentionality	  or	  unintentionally,	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  secondary,	  or	  contingent,	  to	  a	  (dis)continuous	  complex	  that	  connects	  noise’s	  affective	  impact	  on	  the	  aesthetic	  to	  its	  affective	   impact	   on	   the	   flows	   of	   social	   networks,	   its	   affective	   impact	   on	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communicative	   and	   informational	   channels,	   and	   its	   artistic	  manifestations.	   This	   is	  not	   to	   suggest	   that	   all	   noise	   events	   are	   the	   same;	   its	   actualisations	   within	   the	  empirical	  vary	  in	  intensity,	  context	  and	  materiality.	  But,	  arguably,	  there	  is	  something	  that	   can	   be	   called	   noise	   that	   remains	   autonomous	   from	   these	   particular	  actualisations,	   which	   flows	   between	   the	   various,	   interwoven	   planes	   of	   the	   sonic,	  social,	   technological,	   and	   political	   landscape.	   In	   turn,	   noise	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   the	  human,	   or	   those	   sounds	   that	   we	   typically	   think	   of	   as	   ‘noisy’.	   It	   has	   an	   existence	  independent	   from	   particular	   subjects,	   objects	   and	   bodies	   and	   their	   correlative	  ‘goodness’	  and	  ‘badness’.	  	  If	   the	  definition	  of	  noise	  provided	   in	   this	   article	   seems	  broad	  and	  vague	   then	  perhaps	  this	  tells	  something	  of	  the	  ubiquity	  and	  inevitability	  of	  noise.	  By	  suggesting	  that	   noise	   is	   ubiquitous,	   I	   mean	   to	   imply	   something	   different	   to	   the	   aesthetic	  moralist	   arguments	   of	   acoustic	   ecology,	   in	   which	   ubiquitous	   noise	   has	   led	   to	   the	  death	  of	  silence.	  While	  there	  have	  been	  plenty	  of	  recent	  conceptualisations	  of	  noise	  working	   to	   assert	   the	   sublime	   grandeur	   of	   noise,	   these	   accounts	   tend	   to	  miss	   the	  smaller,	  banal	  noises	   that	   shape	  our	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  encounters.46	  Thinking	  of	  noise	  as	  affect	   can,	   hopefully,	   allow	   for	   the	   dramatic	   experiences	   of	   noise	   (as,	   for	   example,	  the	  erasure	  of	  self,	  the	  interruption	  of	  the	  symbolic,	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  sublime)	  as	  well	  as	   the	  everyday	  experiences	  of	  noise	   (the	  barely	  noticeable	   interruptions,	   the	  noises	  we	  are	  accustomed	  to).	  Furthermore,	  the	  openness	  of	  noise	  as	  affect,	  its	  lack	  of	   specificity	   regarding	  sources,	  origins	  and	  objects,	  and	   its	   lack	  of	   commitment	   in	  saying	  what	  noise	  is	  or	  is	  not,	  is	  to	  some	  degree	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  Spinozan	  spirit:	  how	  can	  we	  say	  what	  noise	  is	  when	  we	  know	  not	  yet	  what	  noise	  can	  do?	  	   —	  	  Marie	   Thompson	   is	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   PhD	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   at	   Newcastle	   University,	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  International	   Centre	   for	   Music	   Studies.	   Her	   research	   considers	   the	   ethical	   and	  aesthetic	   implications	   of	   thinking	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   to	   affect.	   She	   is	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